unfinished in order to deal with another, before returning to the original purpose, the gain must be questionable. All that I can suggest is that, once Lucretius had decided to complete book 4 by examining such miscellaneous psychological matters as sex, he may have realized that no satisfactory conclusion to the work could be constructed on this foundation and that he must make use of the Plague of Athens and some contrasting exposition of *ataraxia* to provide a sufficiently powerful conclusion.

So far as we can judge from the work as we now have it, Lucretius' first thoughts were probably better than his second. Whether the change of plan was occasioned primarily by poetical or philosophical considerations; whether by general depression resulting from the defection of Memmius or by the onset of physical or mental illness—this I do not see that we can ever hope to decide. But if what came down to us had been the poem as originally projected, and if Lucretius' last available hours of composition had been spent in fulfilling his initial plan rather than in recasting it to fit a different, and questionably more promising, scheme, we should have something closer to the realization of that original enthusiasm which, as he tells us at the beginning of his enterprise, (1.141–4),

> quemvis efferre laborem
> suadet et inducit noctes vigilare serenas
> quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum
> clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti.

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Addendum:

The closeness of the link between the beginning of 3 and what was written to precede (or even the less gloomy picture at the end of book 2 which precedes in our present text) clearly justifies Bailey, and the majority of other editors, in accepting 'e tantis tenebris' in 3.1 from cod. Monacensis (echoing 'fluctibus e tantis vitae tantisque tenebris' in 5.11), rather than *o* of O and V. Despite the arguments of Timpanaro in *Philologus* 104 (1960), 147–9, who fails to account for the variants in the Italian manuscripts (best explained on the assumption that their parent, P, like L, one of its best attested descendants, and also Q, had a lacuna at this point, resulting from a failure of the scribe of the archetype to insert the capital), neither reading has any more authority than *a* of some of the Italians. M. L. Clarke, in *CQ* N.S. 27 (1977), 354–5, argues that in Latin poetry an address beginning with a relative or participial phrase normally starts with *o*. While the negative of this would be difficult to establish, it is clearly true that such an address never opens with a bare relative. In *Aen.* 8.511 it is covered by *tu*; here the relative 'qui primus potuisti' is covered by the whole previous line, linking the argument closely with the end of the preceding book, in a way paralleled by none of Clarke's other examples, nor by any other I have discovered. The sense thus runs: 'Out of such darkness (as just described) to raise so bright a light, you were the first to be able . . . and I follow your lead as a result, o glory of the Greek race.' Perhaps no less significantly, Clarke asserts that he knows of no example of *o* separated from the relative by such an interval. In fact, a survey of the poems of Cicero, Catullus, Vergil, Horace, Propertius, Ovid, Manilius, Lucan, Valerius Flaccus, and Statius (which would often have been an easier task if Deferrari had admitted that *o* could have any stylistic importance) reveals no example where it is separated at all, except Lucan 1.195, 'o magnae qui', and two examples where a pronoun precedes, Prop. 4.9.33, 'vos precor, o luci sacro quae', and Val. F. 1.7, 'tuque, o pelagi qui'. The anomaly of separation by a whole line, in addition to the lack of parallel for any sort of *o qui* followed by a second *o* plus vocative (also pointed out by Clarke), is enough to guarantee the judgement of the scribe of Monacensis rather than of those of O and V.